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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
 
--------------------------------------------x  
 
BOB WEISS, 
     
                                      Plaintiff 
 
– against – 
  
BARC, INC.  
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION 
12 CV 7571 (TPG) 
 
 
---------------------------------------------x  
 
Pro se plaintiff, Bob Weiss, brings this case against Barc Inc. (“Barc”) 
alleging causes of action under federal and common law, claiming trademark 
infringement, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment.  The complaint 
alleges that both Weiss’s BARK mark and defendant’s BARC mark are used in 
connection with online social networking services.  Weiss claims that Barc’s 
use of the BARC mark infringes on his trademark rights in BARK.  Defendant 
Barc has moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) on 
the ground that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over Barc because its 
only contact with New York is operating a website accessible to anyone with an 
internet connection. 
The court grants the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.   
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The Complaint 
The Parties 
 Weiss is an individual residing in New York and the registered owner of 
the BARK trademark.  Since 2007, Weiss has used the BARK name in 
connection with computer software services including “connecting social 
network users with businesses that study the patterns and behaviors of 
consumers.” Para 7.  Weiss has also used the BARK mark to provide an online 
forum for users to share information including photo, audio, and video content 
about themselves, and receive feedback from peers.   
 The parties do not dispute that Barc is a corporation formed under the 
laws of California, with its principal place of business at San Diego, California.  
Barc operates a social networking site under the domain name www.barc.com, 
which Weiss alleges “is in direct competition with the services that Plaintiff 
offers under his BARK mark.”  Barc describes its business as providing 
software that allows users of online digital media to share information, links, or 
communications with other users.   
Causes of Action 
 Weiss brings four causes of action related to challenging BARC’s use of 
the BARC name in connection with online services.  First, Weiss claims that 
under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114-1116, the BARC mark infringed on Weiss’s trademark 
rights in BARK.  Second, Weiss asserts a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) for 
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unfair competition and false designation of origin.  Third, Weiss makes certain 
claims under the common law.   
Jurisdiction 
 The complaint alleges two bases under which this court has personal 
jurisdiction over Barc.  The complaint claims that Barc “engages in continuous 
business activities in, and directed to the State of New York . . . by offering and 
providing online and computer related services via its website www.barc.com.”  
In addition, the complaint claims that Barc “has committed tortious acts aimed 
at and causing harm within the State of New York.”   
Legal Standard 
 In order to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a 
plaintiff must establish a prima facie showing that such jurisdiction exists.  
Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 495 (2d Cir. 2006).  A proper prima facie 
showing requires the plaintiff to make “averment[s] of facts that if credited 
would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the defendant.”  In re Magnetic 
Audiotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2003).  While the court 
presumes the truth of plaintiff’s allegations for the purposes of the motion to 
dismiss, “mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a prima facie 
showing of personal jurisdiction.”  Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. V. K-Line, Am. 
Inc., 06 CV 0615, 2007 WL 1732435, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2007).  In 
deciding a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, a court can “consider affidavits and documents 
submitted by parties without converting the motion into one for summary 
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judgment.”  ESI Inc. v. Coastal Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 35, 50 n.54 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999).       
 Because this is a federal question case and the federal statute, the 
Lanham Act, does not provide for national service of process, the court applies 
the forum state’s personal jurisdiction rules – New York.  PDK Labs, Inc. v. 
Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1108 (2d Cir. 1997); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1051. 
 New York Personal Jurisdiction Rules 
 In determining whether New York law provides personal jurisdiction over 
Barc, this court must examine both whether BARC is subject to general 
jurisdiction under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“N.Y. C.P.L.R.”) § 
301, or specific jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302.   
  General Jurisdiction - N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301 
 According to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301, a court has general jurisdiction over a 
defendant who is “doing business” in the state, meaning that the in-state 
business activities are done “not occasionally or casually, but with a fair 
measure of permanence and continuity.”  Laufer v. Ostrow, 449 N.Y.S.2d 456, 
458 (1982).  
 Courts consider five factors in determining whether a defendant is “doing 
business” within the state.  These factors include (1) whether the defendant 
maintains an office in the state; (2) whether the defendant has real estate or a 
bank account in the state; (3) whether the defendant has a phone listing in the 
state; (4) whether the defendant solicits or conducts marketing activities in the 
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state; and (5) whether the defendant has employees or agents permanently 
located in the state promoting its interests.  Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 226 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2000).    
Four of these factors weigh against finding that Barc is “doing business” 
in New York.  Barc is a company organized under the laws of California, with 
its only office in California.  Barc does not own, use, or possess any real 
property in New York, and does not have any bank accounts in the state.  
There are also no employees or agents of Barc permanently located within New 
York promoting Barc’s interests.  All of Barc’s employees are located in 
California, except for one who temporarily resides in Georgia.  
Regarding the final factor, whether Barc is soliciting business in New 
York, it is important to understand the current nature of Barc’s business.  
Barc does not currently collect any revenue.  The website is in the initial beta 
testing phase, where it is made available to a limited number of people for the 
purposes of testing and fixing any bugs in the service.  When fully operational, 
Barc states that it will provide web downloadable software, free of charge to 
internet users through its website.  The revenue is expected to come from 
licensing fees Barc will charge web site owners who incorporate Barc’s software 
into their websites and from companies wishing to advertise on Barc’s website.   
Weiss makes no allegation that Barc is engaged in “substantial and 
continuous” solicitation of business in New York, aside from alleging that Barc 
maintains a website directed to New York and has registered users from the 
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New York area.  Weiss offers no basis for finding that Barc’s website targets 
New York as opposed to being available to anyone with an internet connection, 
wherever located.  In fact, Weiss concedes that Barc’s website and promotional 
materials are available to internet users worldwide.  The fact that Barc operates 
a website that is open to the public as a whole is insufficient to form the basis 
for personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301, particularly where there is 
no allegation that Barc receives any revenue from New York or specifically 
targets New York in any way.  See Holey Soles Holdings, Ltd. v. Foam 
Creations, Inc., No. 05 CV 6939, 2006 WL 1147963, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 
2006).   
 Specific Jurisdiction - N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 provides several additional bases in which a New 
York Court can obtain personal jurisdiction over a party.  There are two 
provisions relevant to this case.  Under § 302(a)(1) this court has personal 
jurisdiction over a party where the cause of action arises from the party 
transacting business within the state or contracting anywhere to supply goods 
or service in the state.  And § 302(a)(3) provides personal jurisdiction over a 
party where the cause of action arises from the party committing a tort outside 
New York which causes injury to person or property within the state if the 
party  
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent 
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or 
consumed or services rendered, in the state, or  
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(ii) expects or should reasonable expect the act to have consequences in 
the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international 
commerce.  
 
The other provisions of § 302 are inapplicable because, as discussed 
previously, there are no allegations that Barc regularly does or solicits business 
in New York, derives substantial revenue from interstate activities, or owns, 
uses, or possesses any real property in New York, and the alleged tort was not 
committed in New York.  See Citigroup, Inc. v. City Holding Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 
549, 567 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding when web sites display infringing 
trademarks, the tort is committed where the web site is created or maintained).  
 § 302(a)(1)- Operating a Website 
Weiss primarily relies upon § 302(a)(1) to assert that this court has 
personal jurisdiction over Barc.  Specifically, Weiss claims that New York 
residents have registered as users of Barc’s website.  In addition, Weiss argues 
that Barc and Weiss entered into a contract regarding Barc’s use and 
registration of the BARC mark, and that this litigation arises from that 
contract.   
In contrast to “doing business” under § 301, a single act of the right 
nature and quality can be sufficient to establish that a party has transacted 
business for purposes of § 302(a)(1).  Agency Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Grand 
Rent A Car Corp., 98 F.3d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1996).  However, the transaction 
must be such that the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of 
conducting activities in New York, thereby invoking the benefits and 
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protections of New York law.  Best Van Lines Inc., 490 F.3d 239, 253-54 (2d 
Cir. 2007).  In addition, the cause of action must “arise from the specific New 
York business transaction.”  Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 
467 (1988).   
Courts have found that where a website is directed at the entire United 
States with no evidence that defendants manifested the intent to specifically 
target New York or avail themselves of the benefits of New York law, there is no 
personal jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).  Girl Scouts of U.S. v. Steir, 
102 Fed. App’x 217, 219 (2d Cir. 2004).  The “mere solicitation of business 
within the state does not constitute the transaction of business within the state 
absent some other New York-directed activities.”  Id. at 219-20. 
In determining whether a non-domiciliary defendant’s operation of a 
website is sufficiently connected to New York, courts use a “spectrum of 
interactivity” analysis.  See Royalty Network Inc. v. Dishant.com, LLC, 638 
F.Supp.2d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  Passive websites are ones that are limited to 
making information available to users, and without more specific contact with 
New York there is no jurisdiction over the non-domiciliary defendant.  Id.  
Interactive websites knowingly transmit goods or services to users and if made 
available to New York residents, the activities can be sufficient for obtaining 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant.  Id.  In between are interactive websites 
that allow the exchange of information between users in another state and the 
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defendant.  Id.  For these types of websites jurisdiction depends on the level 
and nature of the exchange.  Id. 
The current version of Barc’s website is in the middle of this spectrum.  
It is not wholly passive because it is not limited to making information 
available.  But it is also not conducting traditional business over the internet 
because it is not selling goods or services, or charging membership fees to 
registered users.  See Capital Records, LLC v. VideoEgg, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d 
349, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  The only connection Barc’s website has to New York 
is it is available to its residents with an internet connection and some New York 
residents have registered through the website.  However, these allegations do 
not rise to the level of alleging that Barc has purposefully and knowingly 
entered into or sought transactions with New York residents.  See Royalty 
Network, Inc. v. Dischant.com, LLC, 638 F.Supp.2d 410, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); 
Freeplay Music, Inc. v. Cox Radio Inc., No. 04 Civ. 5238, 2005 WL 1500896 
(S.D.N.Y. March 4, 2005).   
302(a)(1) – Contract  
Weiss also maintains that personal jurisdiction over Barc is proper under 
302(a)(2) because the suit arises out of a contract between Weiss and Barc.  In 
the contract Weiss and Barc entered into a trademark co-existence agreement 
which allowed Barc to use the BARC mark subject to certain limitations. 
First, given that Weiss does not even mention this contract in its 
complaint, and is not suing on the basis of breach of contract, it is not clear 
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that this suit can be considered as arising out of the contract.  But even 
assuming there is a sufficient connection between the trademark infringement 
action and this contract, the contract does not provide sufficient basis for this 
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Barc. 
The factors courts look to in determining whether a contract suffices to 
provide personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant are 1) whether 
the defendant has an on-going contractual relationship with a New York entity; 
2) whether the contract was negotiated or executed in New York; 3) whether the 
defendant visited New York to meet with parties after the contract was 
executed; 4) whether the contract contains a choice-of-law provision; and 5) 
whether the contract requires the defendant to send notices or payments into 
New York.  Agency Rent a Car Sys., Inc. v. Grand Rent A Car Corp., 98 F.3d 25, 
29 (2d Cir. 1996).  
 There is arguably an ongoing contractual relationship between Barc in 
California and Weiss in New York, though this is not the typical ongoing 
relationship involving the exchange of goods or services.  Moreover, all other 
factors fail to support finding personal jurisdiction over Barc.  Weiss does not 
allege that the contract was negotiated or executed in New York.  Weiss alleges 
that Barc had discussions with Weiss, but never alleges Barc visited New York.  
There is no choice of law provision in the contract, nothing in the contract 
requires Barc to send notices or payment to New York.  
§ 302(a)(3) 
This court also does not have personal jurisdiction over Barc pursuant to 
§ 302(a)(3). As previously stated, Weiss fails to satisfy its burden in alleging 
that Barc regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any business in 
New York. Thus 302(a)(3)(i) does not provide personal jurisdiction. In addition, 
because Barc is currently not earning any revenue, 302(a)(3)(ii) also does not 
provide personal jurisdiction. 
Conclusion 
For the aforementioned reasons this court grants Barc's motion to 

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

80 ORDERED. 
Dated: 	New York, New York 

May 29,2013 

-. Thomas P. GriesaI U. 8. District Judge!l, USDC SDNY 
DOCUMENT 

. ELECTRONICALLY FILED 

l D/-..r< #
_\ \ v\,..> r: --;-­~ \ DArE FILED: Q ~21/ I::S.,
~) ~-------~ .------. ~... - ..
'­
11 
